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Abstract
Constructing adversarial examples in a black-box threat model injures the original images by introducing visual
distortion. In this paper, we propose a novel black-box attack approach that can directly minimize the induced
distortion by learning the noise distribution of the adversarial example, assuming only loss-oracle access to
the black-box network. The quantified visual distortion, which measures the perceptual distance between the
adversarial example and the original image, is introduced in our loss whilst the gradient of the corresponding
non-differentiable loss function is approximated by sampling noise from the learned noise distribution. We
validate the effectiveness of our attack on ImageNet. Our attack results in much lower distortion when compared
to the state-of-the-art black-box attacks and achieves 100% success rate on ResNet50 and VGG16bn. The code
is available at https://github.com/Alina-1997/visual-distortion-in-attack.
1 Introduction
Adversarial attack has been a well-recognized threat to existing
deep neural network based applications. It injects small amount
of noise to a sample (e.g., image, speech, language) but degrades
the model performance drastically [1, 2, 3]. According to the
information that an adversary has of the target network, existing
attack falls into two categories: white-box attack that knows all
the parameters of the target network, and black-box attack that
only has access to the output of the target network. However,
it’s sometimes difficult or even impossible to have full access
to certain networks, which makes the black-box attack practical
and attract more and more attention.
Black-box attack has very limited or no information of the target
network and thus is more challenging to perform. In the lp-
bounded setting, a black-box attack is usually evaluated on two
aspects: number of queries and success rate. In addition, recent
work [4] shows that visual distortion in the adversarial examples
is also an important criteria in practice. Even under a small l∞
bound, perturbing pixels in the image without considering the
visual impact could make the distorted image very annoying. As
shown in Fig. 1, an attack [5] under a small noise level (l∞ ≤
0.05) causes relatively large visual distortion and the perturbed
image is more distinguishable from the original one. Therefore,
under the assumption that the visual distortion caused by the
noise is related to the spatial distribution of the perturbed pixels
in a bounded lp attack, we take a different view from previous
work and focus on explicitly learning a noise distribution based
on its corresponding visual distortion.
In this paper, we propose a novel black-box attack that can di-
rectly minimize the induced visual distortion by learning the
noise distribution of the adversarial example, assuming only
loss-oracle access to the black-box network. The quantified
visual distortion, which measures the perceptual distance be-
tween the adversarial example and the original image, is in-
troduced in our loss where the gradient of the corresponding
non-differentiable loss function is approximated by sampling
noise from the learned noise distribution. The proposed attack
can achieve a trade-off between visual distortion and query effi-
ciency by introducing the weighted perceptual distance metric in
addition to the original loss. Theoretically, we prove the conver-
gence of our model under the assumption that the loss function
is convex. The experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our
attack on ImageNet. Our attack results in much lower distor-
tion than the other attacks and achieves 100% success rate on
ResNet50 and VGG16bn. In addition, it is shown that our attack
is valid even when it’s only allowed to perturb pixels that are
out of the target object in a given image.
2 Related Work
Although adversarial attack poses a big threat to existing net-
works, performing attacks can evaluate the robustness of a net-
work, and further helps improve its robustness by augmenting
adversarial examples in training [6]. Recent research on the
adversarial attack has made advanced progress in developing a
stronger and more computationally efficient adversary. Since
our method is based on black-box attack, we briefly introduce
recent attack techniques in the black-box setting.
Black-box attack considers the target network as a black-box,
and only assumes access to its output scores. Existing methods
for the black-box attack roughly fall into three categories: 1)
Methods that estimate gradient of the black-box. Some methods
estimate the gradient by sampling around a certain point, which
formulates the task as a problem of continuous optimization. Tu
et al. [7] searched for perturbations in the latent space of an auto-
encoder. Ilyas et al. [5] exploited prior information about the
gradient. Al-Dujaili and O‘Reilly [8] reduced query complexity
by estimating just the sign of the gradient. [9] shares similarity
with our method as it also explicitly defines a noise distribution.
However, the distribution in [9] is assumed to be an isometric
normal distribution without considering visual distortion whilst
our method does not assume the distribution to be a specific form
and learns a noise distribution that causes less visual distortion.
Other approaches developed a substitute model [3, 10, 11] to
approximate performance of the black-box. By exploiting the
transferability of adversarial attack [12], the white-box attack
technique applied to the substitute model can be transferred to
the black-box. These approaches assume only label-oracle to
the black-box, whereas training of the substitute model requires
either access to the black-box training dataset or collection of
a new dataset. 2) Methods based on discrete optimization. In
[13, 8], an image is divided into regular grids and the attack is
performed and refined on each grid. Meunier et al. [14] adopted
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Figure 1: Adversarial examples on ImageNet with bounded noise ||δ||∞ ≤ 0.05. The first image is the original unperturbed image.
The following examples are from [5] and our method, respectively. Higher SSIM and lower LPIPS indicate less visual distortion.
Algorithm 1: Our Algorithm
Input: image x, maximum norm , proportion q of the
resampled noise
Output: adversarial example x + δ
1 Initialize noise distribution pθ0 = softmax(θ0) and noise δ0
2 for step t in {1, ..., n} do
3 T ∗ = argminT=0,1,...t−1L(x, x + δT )
4 Compute baseline b = L(x, x + δT ∗ )
5 Update θ using Eq. (17), θt ← θt−1 − ∇F(θt−1)
6 Sample δt,
δt ← sample(δt, q)δt∼pθt ∪ sample(δT ∗ , 1 − q)δT∗∼pθT∗
7 if success f ul_attack(x, x + δt) then
8 return x + δt
9 def success f ul_attack(x, x + δt):
10 if argmaxk1 f (x + δt)k1,argmaxk2 f (x)k2 then
11 return True
12 else
13 return False
the tiling trick by adding the same noise for small square tiles
in the image. 3) Methods that leverage evolutionary strategies
or random search [14, 15]. In [15], the noise value is updated
using a square-shaped random search at each query. Meunier et
al. [14] developed a set of attacks using evolutionary algorithms
using both continuous and discrete optimization.
Previous methods did not consider the visual impact of the in-
duced noise, for which the adversarial example could suffer from
significant visual distortion. This motivates us to consider the
visual quality degradation in the attack model. Under the as-
sumption that the visual distortion caused by the noise is related
to the spatial distribution of the perturbed pixels in a bounded lp
attack, we explicitly define a noise distribution, which is learned
to minimize the visual distortion.
3 Method
3.1 Learning Noise Distribution Based on Visual Distortion
An attack model is an adversary that constructs adversarial ex-
amples against certain networks. Let f : x→ f (x) be the target
network that accepts an input x ∈ Rn and produces an output
f (x) ∈ Rm. f (x) is a vector and f (x)k represents its kth entry,
denoting the score of the kth class. y = argmaxk f (x)k is the
predicted class. Given a valid input x and the corresponding
predicted class y, an adversarial example [16] x′ is similar to x
yet results in an incorrect prediction argmaxk f (x
′)k,y. In an ad-
ditive attack, an adversarial example x′ is a perturbed input with
additive noise δ such that x′ = x + δ, where δ is bounded by an
lp ball. Although there are several choices of p (p = 0, 1, 2,∞),
we discuss l∞ in this paper since our method defines a sample
space with a fixed range for each pixel independently. As for
other p values, please refer to section 4.5 for further discussions.
The problem of generating an adversarial example is equivalent
to produce noise δ that causes wrong prediction for the per-
turbed input. Thus a successful attack is to find δ such that (1)
argmaxk f (x + δ)k,y and (2) ||δ||∞≤. Since the constraint (1) is
highly non-linear, the problem is usually rephrased in a different
form [1]:
minimize
δ
L(x, x + δ)
subject to ||δ||∞ ≤ 
(1)
where L(x, x + δ) is the loss function, which is defined as
max(0, f (x + δ)y − maxk,y f (x + δ)k). The attack is successful
when L = 0. It’s noted that such a loss does not take the visual
impact into consideration, for which the adversarial example
could suffer from significant visual distortion. In order to con-
strain the visual distortion caused by the difference between x
and x + δ, we adopt a perceptual distance metric d(x, x + δ) into
the loss function with a predefined hyperparameter λ:
L(x, x + δ) =max
(
0, f (x + δ)y −maxk,y f (x + δ)k)
+ λd(x, x + δ)
(2)
where smaller d(x, x + δ) indicates less visual distortion. d can
be any form of metric that measures the perceptual distance
between x and x + δ, such as well established 1 − SSIM [17] or
LPIPS [18]. λ manages the trade-off between a successful attack
and the visual distortion caused by the attack. The effects of λ
will be further discussed in Section 4.1.
Minimizing the above loss function facing a challenge that L is
not differentiable since the black-box adversary does not have
access to the gradients of L and the predefined d(x, x + δ) might
be calculated in a non-diffrentiable way. To address this problem,
we explicitly assume a noise distribution of δ and approximate
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Figure 2: Framework of the proposed attack.
the gradient of L by sampling from the distribution. Suppose
that δ follows a distribution pθ parameterized by θ, i.e., δ ∼ pθ.
For the jth pixel in an image, we make its noise distribution
pθ j = softmax(θ j), where θ j is the jth component of θ. The noise
value δ j of the jth pixel is sampled by following pθ j . By sampling
noise from the distribution, θ can be learned to minimize the
expectation of the above loss such that the attack is successful
(i.e., alters the predicted label) and the produced adversarial
example is less distorted (i.e., small d). The expectation is
minimized by sampling δ from pθ for each pixel:
minimize Eδ∼pθ [L(x, x + δ)]
subject to ||δ||∞ ≤  (3)
To ensure the l∞ constraint is satisfied, we define the sample
space of noise δ j for the jth pixel to be a set of discrete values in
the range of − and : δ j ∈ {,  − N ,  − 2 N , ..., 0, ...− }, where
N is the sampling frequency and N is the sampling interval. The
noise value δ j of the jth pixel is sampled from this sample space
by following pθ j .
Given w and h the width and height of an image, respectively,
since each pixel has its own noise distribution pθ j of length
2N + 1, the length of pθ for the entire image is (2N + 1)wh.
Note that we do not consider the difference of color channels.
Thus, the same noise value is sampled for each color channel of
a pixel. To estimate θ, we adopt policy gradient [19] to make
the above expectation differentiable with respect to θ. Using
REINFORCE, we have the differentiable loss function F(θ):
F(θ) = Eδ∼pθ [L(x, x + δ) − b]
= (L(x, x + δ) − b) log(pθ(δ)) (4)
∇F(θ) = ∇θEδ∼pθ [L(x, x + δ) − b]
= (L(x, x + δ) − b)(1 − pθ(δ)) (5)
where b is introduced as a baseline in the expectation with spe-
cific meaning: 1) when L(x, x + δ) < b, the sampled δ returns
low L, and its probability pθ(δ) increases through gradient de-
scent; 2) when L(x, x + δ) = b, ∇F(θ) = 0 and pθ(δ) remains
unchanged; 3) when L(x, x + δ) > b, the sampled δ returns high
L, and its probability pθ(δ) decreases through gradient descent.
To sum up, L(x, x + δ) is forced to improve over b. At the it-
eration t, we choose b = minT=0,1,...t−1L(x, x + δT ) such that L
improves over the obtained minimal loss.
The above expectation is estimated using a single Monte Carlo
sampling at each iteration, and the sampling of noise δ is
critical. Simply sampling δt at the iteration t on the entire
image might cause large variance on the norm of the noise,
i.e., ||δt − δt−1||2. Therefore, to ensure a small variance, with
T ∗ = argminT=0,1,...t−1L(x, x +δT ), only a small proportion of the
noise is randomly resampled from iteration T ∗ while the others
remain unchanged. Let q be the proportion of the resampled
noise at each iteration, the updated δt at an iteration t is
δt ← sample(δt, q)δt∼pθt ∪ sample(δT ∗ , 1 − q)δT∗∼pθT∗ (6)
where sample(δt, q) denotes randomly sampling proportion q of
the noise from δt. As shown in Fig. 2, at the iteration t, propor-
tion q of noise δt is resampled by following the corresponding
distribution pθt . Then, the feedback L(x, x + δt) from the black-
box and the perceptual distance metric decide the update of the
distribution pθt . The iteration stops when the attack is successful,
i.e., max(0, f (x + δt)y −maxk,y f (x + δt)k) = 0.
3.2 Proof of Convergence
Ruan et al. [20] shows that feed-forward DNNs (Deep Neural
Networks) are Lipschitz continuous with a Lipschitz constant K.
Therefore, we have
∀t1, t2, || f (x + δt1 ) − f (x + δt2 )||2 ≤ K||δt1 − δt2 ||2 (7)
Let t1 = t and t2 = T ∗, where T ∗ = argminT=0,1,...t−1L(x, x + δT ),
we have
∀t, || f (x + δt) − f (x + δT ∗ )||2 ≤ K||δt − δT ∗ ||2 (8)
At an iteration t, since only a small proportion of the noise is
randomly resampled from iteration T ∗, it can be assumed that
|maxk,y f (x + δt)k −maxk,y f (x + δT ∗ )k | ≤ C (9)
where C is a constant. Note that the learning stops when the at-
tack is successful, i.e., max
(
0, f (x + δt)y−maxk,y f (x + δt)k) = 0.
Therefore, max
(
0, f (x + δt)y −maxk,y f (x + δt)k) = f (x + δt)y −
maxk,y f (x + δt)k > 0 until the learning stops. Suppose that the
perceptual distance metric d is normalized to [0, 1]. Substituting
the inequalities (8) and (9) in our definition of L in Eq. (2) gets
the following inequality:
|L(x, x + δt) − L(x, x + δT ∗ )|
≤ |maxk,y f (x + δt)k −maxk,y f (x + δT ∗ )k |
+ | f (x + δt)y − f (x + δT ∗ )y|
+ λ|d(x, x + δt) − d(x, x + δT ∗ )|
≤ K||δt − δT ∗ ||2 + C + λ
(10)
Note that ||δt ||∞ is bounded by . Given width w, height h,
channel c of the image, and the resampled proportion q of the
noise from iteration T ∗, we have
||δt − δT ∗ ||2 ≤ 2whcq (11)3
Thus, the inequality (10) becomes
|L(x, x + δt) − L(x, x + δT ∗ )| ≤ 2Kwhcq + C + λ (12)
Ideally, L(x, x + δt) − L(x, x + δT ∗) accurately quantifies the
difference of the perturbed image even when only one noise
value for just a single pixel at the iteration t is sampled differently
from that at T ∗. Let x + δi jt represent the perturbed image with
the ith noise value of the jth pixel being sampled. Note that θ is
a vector of length (2N + 1) ·wh, denoting that there are (2N + 1)
noise values that could be sampled for each pixel. Similarly,
pθ(δ
i j
t ) denotes the probability of the ith noise value of the jth
pixel being sampled. By sampling every noise value for the jth
pixel, we define l jt and pθ jt to be a vector:
∀ j ∈ {1, 2, ...,wh}, l jt = vector[L(x, x + δi jt ) − L(x, x + δT ∗ )],
i = 1, 2, ..., 2N + 1 (13)
∀ j ∈ {1, 2, ...,wh}, pθ jt = vector[pθ(δt
i j)],
i = 1, 2, ..., 2N + 1 (14)
Although the above equations are only meaningful under the
ideal situation where L can quantify the difference of just one
perturbed pixel, we use these equations for a theoretical proof
of convergence. In the ideal situation, instead of using a single
Monte Carlo sampling to estimate ∇F(θt) as in Eq. (5), the jth
component of ∇F(θt) can be calculated exactly as
∇F(θ jt ) = l jt · (1 − pθ jt ) (15)
where ∇F(θ jt ) is the jth component of ∇F(θt). According to Eq.
(12) when the number of the resampled pixels whq=1, we have
|L(x, x + δi jt ) − L(x, x + δT ∗ )| ≤ 2Kc + C + λ (16)
Note that for ∀t1, t2 that share the same T ∗, l jt1 is equal to l jt2 .
Thus, replacing the inequality (18) in Eq. (17) gets
||∇F(θ jt1 ) − ∇F(θ jt2 )||2
≤ ||l jt1 ||2||(1 − pθ jt1 ) − (1 − pθ jt2 )||2
≤ (2N + 1)(2Kc + C + λ)||pθ jt1 − pθ jt2 ||2
= (2N + 1)(2Kc + C + λ)||softmax(θ jt1 ) − softmax(θ jt2 )||2
(17)
In practice, we adopt a single Monte Carlo sampling instead of
sampling every noise values for every pixel, for which 2N + 1
should be replaced by 1 in the above inequality. The inequality
(17) thus becomes:
||∇F(θ jt1 ) − ∇F(θ jt2 )||2
≤ (2Kc + C + λ)||softmax(θ jt1 ) − softmax(θ jt2 )||2
(18)
Since the standard softmax function is Lipschitz continuous with
the Lipschitz constant being 1 [21]. We have
||∇F(θ jt1 ) − ∇F(θ jt2 )||2 ≤ (2Kc + C + λ)||θ jt1 − θ jt2 ||2 (19)
Finally, the inequality for ||∇F(θt1 ) − ∇F(θt2 )||2 becomes
||∇F(θt1 ) − ∇F(θt2 )||2
=
√√ wh∑
j=1
||∇F(θ jt1 ) − ∇F(θ jt2 )||22
≤ (2Kc + C + λ)
√√ wh∑
j=1
||θ jt1 − θ jt2 ||22
= (2Kc + C + λ)||θt1 − θt2 ||2 (20)
The above inequality proves that F(θ) is L-smooth with the
Lipschitz constant being 2Kc + C + λ. Assuming that F(θ)
is convex, according to the convergence theorem for gradient
descent [22], it follows that
F(θt) − F(θ∗) ≤
(2Kc + C + λ) · ||θ0 − θ∗||22
t
(21)
where θ∗ is the optimal solution. When t is large enough, F(θt)
approximates F(θ∗) up to a small enough epsilon and the learn-
ing converges.
4 Experiments
Following previous work [14, 5], we validate the effectiveness
of our model on the large-scale ImageNet [23] dataset. We use
three pretrained classification networks on Pytorch as the black-
box networks: InceptionV3 [24], ResNet50 [25] and VGG16bn
[26]. The attack is performed on images that were correctly
classified by the pretrained network. We randomly select 1000
images in the validation set for test, and all images are normal-
ized to [0, 1]. We quantify our success in terms of the perceptual
distance (1 − SSIM and LPIPS) as we address the visual dis-
tortion caused by the attack. In these two metrics, 1 − SSIM
[17] measures the degradation of structural information in the
adversarial examples. Smaller 1− SSIM indicates closer percep-
tual distance. LPIPS [18] evaluates the perceptual similarity of
two images with their normalized distance between their deep
features. Smaller value of LPIPS denotes less visual distortion.
Except for 1 − SSIM and LPIPS, the success rate and average
number of queries are also reported as in most frameworks.
The average number of queries refers to the average number of
requests to the output of the black-box network.
We initialize the noise distribution pθ to be a uniform distribution
and noise δ0 to be 0. The learning rate is 0.01 and q is set to be
0.01. In addition, we specify the shape of the resampled noise
at each iteration to be a square [14, 13, 15], and adopt the tiling
trick [5, 14] with tile size= 2. The upper bound  of our attack
is set to be 0.05 as in previous work.
4.1 Ablation Studies
In the ablation studies, the maximum number of queries is set
to be 10, 000. The results are averaged on 1000 test images. In
the following, we discuss the trade-off between visual distortion
and query efficiency, the effects of using different perceptual
distance metrics in the loss function and the results on different
sampling frequencies.
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Table 1: Ablation results of the perceptual distance metric, λ and sampling frequency N. Smaller 1 − SSIM and LPIPS indicate
less visual distortion.
Sampling Perceptual
λ
Success 1 − SSIM LPIPS Avg.Frequency Metric Rate Queries
N = 1
- 0 100% 0.091 0.099 356
1 − SSIM
10 100% 0.076 0.081 401
100 97.4% 0.036 0.051 1395
200 92.2% 0.025 0.040 2534
LPIPS
10 100% 0.080 0.078 450
100 98.1% 0.049 0.052 1174
200 95.1% 0.038 0.045 1928
N = 2 1 − SSIM 10 99.7% 0.071 0.074 520
N = 5 1 − SSIM 10 99.5% 0.069 0.070 665
N = 10 1 − SSIM 10 98.7% 0.062 0.075 669
N = 12 1 − SSIM 10 98.7% 0.071 0.075 673
Trade-off between visual distortion and query efficiency.
Under the same l∞ ball, a query-efficient way to produce an
adversarial example is to perturb most pixels with the maximum
noise values ± [13, 15]. However, such attack introduces large
visual distortion, which could make the distorted image very
annoying. To constrain the visual distortion, the perturbed pix-
els should be those who cause smaller visual difference while
performing a valid attack, which takes extra queries to find.
This brings the trade-off between visual distortion and query
efficiency. Different from previous work, this trade-off can be
controlled by λ in our loss function. As shown in Table 1,
when N = 1 and λ = 0, the adversary does not consider visual
distortion at all, and perturbs each pixel that is helpful for mis-
classification until the attack is successful. Thus, it causes the
largest perceptual distance (0.081 and 0.089) with the least num-
ber of queries (356). As λ increases to 200, both 1 − SSIM and
LPIPS decrease at the cost of more queries and lower success
rate. The maximum λ in Table 1 is 200 since further increasing
it causes the success rate to be lower than 90%. Fig. 3 gives
several visualized examples on different λ, where adversarial
examples with larger λ suffer from less visual distortion.
Ablation studies on the perceptual distance metric. The
perceptual distance metric d in the loss function is predefined to
measure the visual distortion between the adversarial example
and the original image. We adopt 1 − SSIM and LPIPS as the
perceptual distance metric to optimize, respectively, and report
their results in Table 1. When λ = 10, optimizing 1 − SSIM
shows better score on 1 − SSIM (0.066 v.s. 0.070) whilst op-
timizing LPIPS has better performance on LPIPS (0.068 v.s.
0.071). However, when λ increases to 100 and 200, optimiz-
ing 1 − SSIM gives better scores on both 1 − SSIM and LPIPS.
Therefore, we set the perceptual distance metric to be 1 − SSIM
in the following experiments.
Sampling frequency. Sampling frequency decides the size of
the sample space of δ. Setting higher frequency means there
are more noise values to explore through sampling. In Table
1, increasing the sampling frequency from N = 1 to N = 2
reduces the perceptual distance to some extent at the cost of
lower success rate. On the other hand, further increasing N to 12
does not essentially reduce the distortion yet lowers the success
rate. To ensure a high success rate of attack, we set the sampling
frequency N = 1 in the following experiments. Note that the
maximum sampling frequency is N = 12 because the sampling
interval in RGB color space (i.e., 255 ∗ 0.05/N) would be less
than 1 if N > 12. See Fig. 4 for a few adversarial examples.
4.2 Out-of-Object Attack
Most existing classification networks [25, 27] are based on CNN
(Convolutional Neural Network), which gradually aggregates
contextual information in deeper layers. Therefore, it is pos-
sible to fool the classifier by just attacking the “context”, i.e.,
background that is out of the target object. Attacking just the
out-of-object pixels constrains the number and the position of
pixels that can be perturbed, which might further reduce the
visual distortion caused by the noise. To locate the object in a
given image, we exploited the object bounding box provided by
ImageNet. An out-of-object mask is then created according to
the bounding box such that the model is only allowed to attack
pixels that are out of the object, as shown in Fig. 5. In Table
2, we report results of InceptionV3, ResNet50 and VGG16bn
with the maximum queries= 40, 000. The attack is performed
on images whose masks are at least 10% large of the image
area. The results show that attacking just the out-of-object pix-
els can also cause misclassification of the object with over 90%
success rate. Compared with image attack, the out-of-object
attack is more difficult for the adversary in that it requires more
number of queries (4275/3775/3104) yet has lower success rate
(90.1%/93.8%/94.7%). On the other hand, the out-of-object at-
tack indeed reduces visual distortion of the adversarial examples
on the three networks.
4.3 Attack Effectiveness on Defended Network
In the above experiments, we show that our black-box model
can attack the undefended network with high success rate. To
evaluate the strength of the proposed attack in defended situ-
ation, we further attack the InceptionV3 network that adopts
5
Figure 3: Visualized examples of the proposed attack. From left to right is the original image, the adversarial examples on
λ = 0, λ = 10, λ = 100, λ = 200, respectively.
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Figure 4: Adversarial examples under different sampling frequency. From left to right is the original image, the adversarial
examples from N = 1, 2, 5, 10, 12, respectively.
Table 2: Results of the out-of-object attack on ImageNet when λ = 10,N = 1 and the perceptual distance metric being 1− SSIM. I,
R and V represent InceptionV3, ResNet50 and VGG16bn, respectively.
Attacked Success 1 − SSIM LPIPS Avg.Range Rate Queries
I R V I R V I R V I R V
Image 100% 100% 100% 0.078 0.076 0.072 0.096 0.081 0.079 845 401 251
Out-of-object 90.1% 93.8% 94.7% 0.071 0.069 0.074 0.081 0.065 0.070 4275 3775 3104
Table 3: Comparison of the undefended (v3) and defended
(v3adv-ens4) InceptionV3. The defended InceptionV3 adopts en-
semble adversarial training.
Network Clean Accuracy After Attack 1 − SSIM LPIPS Avg. Queries
v3 75.8% 0.8% 0.096 0.149 531
v3adv-ens4 73.4% 1.8% 0.103 0.154 777
ensemble adversarial training (i.e., v3adv-ens4). Following [6],
we set  = 0.0625 and randomly select 10, 000 images from
the ImageNet validation set for test. The maximum number of
queries is 10, 000. The performance of the attacked network is
reported in Table3, where clean accuracy is the classification
accuracy before attack. Note that v3 is slightly different from
InceptionV3 in Table 1 in that the pretrained model of v3 comes
from Tensorflow, which is the same platform of the pretrained
model of v3adv-ens4. Compared with undefended network, at-
tacking defended one causes larger visual distortion. However,
the proposed attack can still reduce the classification accuracy
from 73.4% to 1.8%, which demonstrates its effectiveness under
defend.
4.4 Comparison with Other Attacks
Different from previous work which focuses on query efficiency,
our model addresses improving the visual similarity between
the adversarial example and the original image. Therefore, the
proposed method might cost more number of queries to construct
a less distorted adversarial example. To show that such costs
are affordable, we compare our attack to recently proposed
query-efficient black-box attacks: SignHunter [8], NAttack [9],
Bandits [5] and Square Attack [15]. Since these attacks do not
consider visual distortion, for fair comparison, we add 1−SSIM
7
Figure 5: Visualized adversarial examples in out-of-object attack. The red bounding box locates the target object in the original image. In
out-of-object attack, the adversary is only allowed to perturb pixels that are out of the object bounding box. In image attack, the adversary can
perturb any pixel in the image.
8
Figure 6: Adversarial examples from different attacks with perceptual distance scores. From left to right is the original image, the
adversarial examples from [5], [15], [8], [9] and our method, respectively.
Table 4: Results of different attacks on ImageNet. I, R and V represent InceptionV3, ResNet50 and VGG16bn, respectively.
Attack
Success 1 − SSIM LPIPS Avg.Rate Queries
I R V I R V I R V I R V
SignHunter [8] 98.4% - - 0.157 - - 0.117 - - 450 - -
NAttack [9] 99.5% - - 0.133 - - 0.212 - - 524 -
Bandits [5] 96.5% 98.8% 98.2% 0.343 0.307 0.282 0.201 0.157 0.140 935 705 388
Square Attack [15] 99.7% 100% 100% 0.280 0.279 0.299 0.265 0.243 0.247 237 62 30
SignHunter-SSIM 97.6% - - 0.220 - - 0.157 - - 642 - -
NAttack-SSIM 97.3% - - 0.128 - - 0.210 - - 666 - -
Bandits-SSIM 80.0% 89.3% 89.7% 0.333 0.303 0.275 0.200 0.163 0.135 1318 1020 793
Square Attack-SSIM 99.2% 100% 100% 0.260 0.268 0.292 0.256 0.238 0.245 278 65 30
Ours 98.7% 100% 100% 0.075 0.076 0.072 0.094 0.081 0.079 731 401 251
in their objective functions accordingly with λ = 10 as in our
method, which are represented by -SSIM In Table 4. The
results of the above methods are reproduced using the official
codes provided by the authors. In NAttack, we set the sample
size to be 10 since the original large sample size in the paper is
computationally expensive. The maximum number of queries
is 10, 000 as in previous work. In our model, considering the
trade-off between visual distortion and query efficiency, we
set λ = 10,N = 1 and the perceptual distance metric to be
1−SSIM. In Table 4, the proposed attack reduces 1−SSIM and
LPIPS approximately by half while remaining a high success
rate (98.7%/100%/100%) within limited number of iterations.
Except for Signhunter, introducing 1 − SSIM in the objective
function helps reduce visual distortion in other attacks. However,
our method still outperforms these attacks since the perceptual
distance metric is directly minimized in our method. In addition,
the number of queries of our attack is comparable to that of
Bandits. Note that the success rates have a sharp decrease in
Bandits-SSIM compared with Bandits. This is because Bandits
attack uses estimated gradient of the black-box classifier as
its prior, whereas simply adding 1 − SSIM in the loss causes
inaccurate gradient. The visualized adversarial examples from
different attacks are given in Fig. 6, which shows that our model
produces less distorted adversarial examples. More examples
can be found in Fig. 7.
We noticed that SignHunter produces adversarial examples with
horizontal-stripped noise and Square Attack generates adver-
sarial examples with vertical-stripped noise. Stripped noise is
helpful in improving query efficiency since the classification
network is quite sensitive to such noise [15]. However, from the
perspective of visual distortion, such noise greatly degrades the
image quality. The adversarial examples of Bandits are relatively
perceptible-friendly, but the perturbation affects most pixels in
the image, which causes visually “noisy” effects, especially in a
monocolor background. The noise produced by Nattack appear
to be regular color patches all over the image due to its large
tiling size in the method.
4.5 Other lp Attacks
Although our method in this paper is based on l∞ attack, other lp
(p = 0, 1, 2) distance can be regarded as the perceptual distance
metric d in the loss function, which is minimized with a trade-off
parameter λ. We did not discuss it in the experiments because
these lp distance metrics are less accurate in measuring the
perceptual distance between images compared to the specifically
designed metrics, such as well-established 1− SSIM and LPIPS.
In Table 5, the results of other lp (p = 0, 1, 2) attacks are shown,
where the lp distance is normalized to [0, 1] as the perceptual
distance metric d in the loss function. Specifically, d(x, x + δ) =
lp(x,x+δ)
maxδ(lp(x,x+δ))
, where lp(x, x + δ) is the lp distance between the
original image x and the perturbed image x + δ. As in the paper,
we set λ = 10,  = 0.05 and the maximum number of queries
being 10, 000. We find that the raw l0 and l1 scores have much
higher order of magnitude compared with other metrics, and
thus the normalized scores of l0 and l1 distances are reported
in Table 5. Note that when the sampling frequency N = 1, l0
distance is equivalent to l1 distance in that
l1(x, x + δ)
maxδ(l1(x, x + δ))
=
mc · 
whc · 
=
m
wh
=
l0(x, x + δ)
maxδ(l0(x, x + δ))
(22)
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Figure 7: More visualized adversarial examples from different attacks.
Table 5: Results of other lp attacks on ResNet50 when λ = 10. The raw l0 and l1 scores have much higher order of magnitude
compared with other metrics, and thus the normalized scores of l0 and l1 distances are reported.
Distance Metric Sampling Frequency Success Rate 1 − SSIM LPIPS l0 l1 l2 Avg. Queries
l0
1 99.5% 0.077 0.083 0.133 0.130 6.75 536
2 99.2% 0.065 0.069 0.159 0.118 5.88 679
5 97.9% 0.058 0.065 0.177 0.118 5.19 960
l1
1 99.5% 0.077 0.083 0.133 0.130 6.75 536
2 99.5% 0.070 0.076 0.176 0.130 6.14 658
5 99.2% 0.066 0.070 0.218 0.129 5.74 800
l2
1 99.5% 0.110 0.112 0.215 0.211 8.21 392
2 99.5% 0.092 0.100 0.259 0.191 7.44 431
5 99.5% 0.087 0.094 0.312 0.185 6.89 579
where m is the number of perturbed pixels. w, h and c are
the width, height and number of channels of a given image,
respectively. Table 5 shows that optimizing l0 distance gives
better performance on both the perceptual distance metrics and
the lp distance metrics.
4.6 Conclusion
We introduce a novel black-box attack based on the induced vi-
sual distortion in the adversarial example. The quantified visual
distortion, which measures the perceptual distance between the
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adversarial example and the original image, is introduced in our
loss where the gradient of the corresponding non-differentiable
loss function is approximated by sampling from a learned noise
distribution. The proposed attack can achieve a trade-off be-
tween visual distortion and query efficiency by introducing the
weighted perceptual distance metric in addition to the original
loss. The experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our at-
tack on ImageNet as our model achieves much lower distortion
when compared to existing attacks. In addition, it is shown that
our attack is valid even when it’s only allowed to perturb pixels
that are out of the target object in a given image.
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